![]() Several important aspects of this relationship remain unclear, however. Although these models posit different organizational structures for autobiographical knowledge, they both maintain that autobiographical memories rely heavily on specific sensory–perceptual data. Rubin and colleagues have outlined a multiple-systems model of autobiographical memory (Rubin, 2006) in which autobiographical memories consist of a number of components that are behaviorally and neuropsychologically distinct, including sensory imagery, emotion, and narrative coherence. Conway and colleagues’ model (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) posits that autobiographical knowledge can be divided into at least three levels of specificity: lifetime periods, general events, and event-specific knowledge, with the last of these levels consisting largely of sensory–perceptual information. ![]() Most theoretical accounts propose that autobiographical memory is a complex cognitive process that draws on many other processes, both metacognitive and not. Reliving and belief are two of the most fundamental metacognitive components of autobiographical memory, but they are not the only components involved. ![]() The relearned experience feels as though it could very well have happened to someone else, precisely because it lacks the “warmth and intimacy” that marks it as their own. This notion is no mere philosophical contrivance: People with retrograde autobiographical amnesia can learn about what happened during the amnesic period, but they may nevertheless maintain that they do not really remember it. For these reasons, other work (Baddeley, 1992 Brewer, 1996), including our own (Greenberg & Rubin, 2003 Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003), has held that this sense of reliving is a defining feature of autobiographical memory-that it distinguishes autobiographical memory from other forms of memory, such as semantic or implicit retrieval. Tulving, for instance, suggested that episodic memory (of which we consider autobiographical memory a part) involves autonoetic consciousness, or consciousness of a previous conscious experience (e.g., Tulving, 1985). Modern authors have made a similar distinction. The results support the idea that visual imagery plays a vital and irreplaceable role in autobiographical recall. We found that they had a deficit of auditory imagery, as well moreover, they were much less likely than controls to feel as though they were reliving their memories. In a third experiment, we examined the memories of individuals who had a congenital absence of visual imagery. We found that, for both kinds of participant, visual imagery was correlated with the feeling that they were reliving their memories, but auditory imagery played a greater role in verbalizers. In a second experiment, we examined the autobiographical memories of people with different cognitive styles-namely, visualizers and verbalizers. We found no significant positive relation between imagery ability and autobiographical memory, except on a measure of cognitive style. ![]() In the first experiment, we examined the relation between the phenomenological properties of autobiographical memory and several measures of visual-imagery ability. We conducted three experiments to explore this relationship. Visual imagery plays a fundamental role in autobiographical memory, but several aspects of this role remain unclear. ![]()
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